To address the question of whether cognitive plasticity varies by age and level of cognitive functioning in the older population, the authors used a self-guided retest paradigm to assess the basic forms of plasticity of 34 young-olds (M ϭ 74.4 years, range ϭ 70 -79) and 34 oldest-olds (M ϭ 84.0 years, range ϭ 80 -91), with half in each age group screened for high or low (midrange) level of cognitive functioning. As a whole, members of the sample represent about the upper two thirds of their age cohorts. Results show persistent, though age-reduced, learning in all samples and across all tests. However, age is not differentially "kinder" to the more able with respect to the age-graded decline in learning.
The performance-competence distinction has a long history in cognitive and developmental psychology (Piaget, 1937; Thorndike, 1908) , and one challenging question is how to explore the latent potential beyond observable performance levels (e.g., Baltes, 1993) . A growing body of evidence suggests that performance improvement (i.e., plasticity) with training is possible for older adults in their 60s and 70s (e.g., Baltes & Lindenberger, 1988; Rockstroh, Dietrich, & Pokorny, 1995; Schaie & Willis, 1986) . Considering an increasing interest in the oldest age (Baltes & Smith, 2003) , the primary goal of this study was to investigate whether cognitive plasticity continues to exist in the oldest-old. The distinction between the young-old versus the oldest-old is dynamic, varying with societal and historical context (Baltes & Smith, 2003; Neugarten, 1975) . Based on the finding of the Berlin Aging Study (BASE; Baltes & Mayer, 1999) , which shows overall negative changes in the oldest age, and following the framework of the Third and the Fourth Age (Baltes, 1997) , the approach in this study is to consider participants ages 80 and onward, primarily in their 80s, as oldest-olds and those ages 70 to 79 as young-olds.
Besides age, other variables, such as dementia, education, baseline performance, and life history, have previously been studied in examining interindividual differences in plasticity (e.g., Camp, 1998; Owens, 1959; Piccinin & Rabbitt, 1999; Willis, 2001) . With a fresh perspective, the second goal of this study was to investigate whether cognitive plasticity in old age varies by level of cognitive ability within a range of normal functioning-or in other words, whether age is differentially "kinder" to the more able when focus is not only on performance level but also on plasticity. To this end, we used a theory-based measure of intellectual abilities for which normative data are available. As shown later, this measure of the level of cognitive functioning has explanatory potential over participants' educational backgrounds.
It has been demonstrated that the young-old have remarkable capacities to maintain their professional skills (Krampe & Charness, 2006) or acquire new learning skills (Verhaeghen & Marcoen, 1996) through deliberate practice. However, given the substantial declines in cognitive performance among the oldest-olds in the BASE, it is plausible that cognitive plasticity is very limited at this point of life. To explore this issue, Singer, Lindenberger, and Baltes (2003) used the method-of-loci mnemonic paradigm, which had yielded substantial learning in the young-old (e.g., Kliegl, Smith, & Baltes, 1990) , to train a sample of oldest-olds without dementia (age range ϭ 75-101 years). They found that despite an initial benefit from the mnemonic instruction, a majority of the oldest-olds were unable to further enhance their memory performance during extended practice using the new mnemonic technique. This finding suggests that the potential to acquire and optimize new skills is severely limited or lost in the oldest-olds.
In the current study, we used a self-guided retest training paradigm without feedback. With a minimal amount of intervention, the retest paradigm permits researchers to explore a basic form of cognitive plasticity, namely, retest learning (i.e., performance improvement through retest practice), by reactivating or refreshing skills available in repertoires. Cognitive plasticity in the oldest-old, if it exists, should most likely manifest itself under these conditions. This type of training has previously been found to be remarkably effective for 60-to 80-year-olds (Baltes, Sowarka, & Kliegl, 1989; Hofland, Willis, & Baltes, 1981) . The selection of the tasks used in the retest training was aimed at measuring a broad spectrum of psychometric abilities. Following established models of adult intellectual functioning (Baltes, Cornelius, Spiro, Nesselroade, & Willis, 1980; Lindenberger & Baltes, 1994 , 1997 , we chose three ability domains for which age-related changes have been well-documented: reasoning (e.g., Horn, 1978) , speed (e.g., Birren, 1964; Hoyer, Stawski, Wasylyshyn, & Verhaeghen, 2004) , and attention (e.g., McDowd & Birren, 1990) .
In summary, we used a retest paradigm involving psychometric abilities to address two questions: (a) whether basic forms of plasticity continue to exist in the oldest-old, albeit possibly reduced as compared with the young-old, and (b) whether high levels of cognitive functioning provide an advantage in moderating these hypothesized age-related declines in plasticity. In general, we assumed that the training materials and required procedures used are easier than those applied in the Singer et al. (2003) study.
Method

Participants
Ninety-eight older adults from a large community-dwelling participant pool were originally screened with a pretest protocol. Twenty-one participants were dropped from this initial sample because they did not fulfill the requirements of matched age-and functioning-based group assignments. One participant was excluded because of a low score on the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) . Eight others dropped out for other reasons (e.g., poor health, traveling, moving, or lack of motivation).
Screening procedure for the level of cognitive functioning. Participants' levels of cognitive functioning were determined by their percentile ranks with respect to norms provided by the BASE, a longitudinal study of a core representative sample (N ϭ 516, age range ϭ 70 -103 years) of Berlin's older population. Each of the four age brackets (70 -74, 75-79, 80 -84, and 85-91) of the BASE sample was subdivided into 20 different percentile ranks ranging from 5 to 100. Percentile ranks were based on a unit-weighted composite score (i.e., averaged z scores) for each individual across four representative tests from the BASE cognitive battery (Lindenberger, Mayr, & Kliegl, 1993) comprising two speed tests (Digit Letter and Identical Pictures) and two fluency tests (Word Beginning and Category). The selection of the four representative tests was driven by conceptual and empirical considerations. In the two-component models of intelligence (Baltes, Staudinger, & Lindenberger, 1999; Horn & Cattell, 1966) , speed tests represent mechanic or fluid intelligence, which primarily mediates age-related variance in general intelligence (Birren, 1964; Lindenberger et al., 1993) , and fluency tests have proven to be excellent indicators of pragmatic or crystallized intelligence (Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997) . Overall, the eight tests in the BASE cognitive battery showed uniformly high intercorrelations in the BASE samples (Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997) and in our data. In addition, a broader measure of cognitive functioning based on the eight tests did not change the pattern of retest learning to be reported here.
The final sample. The final sample in the retest training consisted of 34 young-olds (age range ϭ 70 -79 years, M ϭ 74.4, SD ϭ 2.7) and 34 oldest-olds (age range ϭ 80 -91 years, M ϭ 84.0, SD ϭ 3.4), with each age group divided evenly into subgroups of high versus low level of cognitive functioning at the 75th percentile rank of the corresponding age bracket. In general terms, these represent about the upper two thirds of their respective surviving peers in the Berlin population. The young-old and oldest-old samples had similar distributions, with a median rank at the 55th percentile for the low and at the 95th percentile for the high level of cognitive functioning group, respectively. All participants in the final sample had good self-reported health ratings and no serious vision or hearing problems. None had a known diagnosis of dementia, and all scored above 23 on the MMSE. No group differences were identified for either the MMSE score ( p Ͼ .15) or educational background ( p Ͼ .19). Sample characteristics are summarized in Table 1 .
Materials
The computerized BASE cognitive battery and two paper-and-pencil tests, Raven Matrices Test (Raven, 1962; Wanner, 1998) and Letter Sets (Thurstone, 1962) , were administered during pretest and posttest sessions.
1
Following the rationale provided in the introduction, we selected four tests of reasoning ability as retest tasks: Cultural Fair Test (Culture Fair Test 20, Form A, Part 1; Weiß, 1987 ); Raven's Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1962) ; Letter Series (Blieszner, Willis, & Baltes, 1981) , and Number Series (Blieszner et al., 1981) . In addition, we included two other retest tasks: the Digital Symbol Substitution Test (DSST; Wechsler, 1981) , as a measure of perceptual-motor speed, and the D2 Test (Brickenkamp, 1994) , a measure of sustained visual attention with well-documented internal consistency and validity (Bates & Lemay, 2004) .
Procedure
Data were collected during eight sessions: one pretest, six retest, and one posttest sessions. In the pretest session, participants completed, in addition to the cognitive measures described earlier, a demographic questionnaire, the MMSE, and tests of visual and auditory acuity. The six retest sessions, lasting about 1 hr each, covered a 3-week period, with two sessions per week and a minimum 2-day interval between two adjacent sessions. In each retest session, the six retest tasks were administered under standard timed conditions in groups of 2 to 5 participants. The order of the tasks was counterbalanced across sessions and participants. In the posttest session, the same cognitive measures as those of the pretest session were administered.
Results
Data from the pretest and posttest sessions were omitted from the following analyses because the primary focus of this article is on retest learning (i.e., performance improvement across the retest sessions). To obtain comparable baselines for the groups, we transformed raw scores (i.e., the number of correct solutions) for each retest test into T scores with M ϭ 50 and SD ϭ 10, standardized to the scores of the total sample in the first retest session. T scores were analyzed with mixed-design analyses of variance (ANOVAs), with age group (the young-old vs. the oldest-old) and level of cognitive functioning (high vs. low) as between-subjects factors and retest session as a within-subjects factor. Separate ANOVAs were conducted for each of the three ability domains (reasoning, perceptual-motor speed, and visual attention), with 1 The reduced version of the BASE cognitive battery was run on a Macintosh SE/30 equipped with a touch-sensitive screen. It assessed four intellectual abilities with two tests each: (a) perceptual speed (Digit Letter and Identical Picture), (b) memory (Memory for Text and Paired Associates), (c) fluency (Category and Word Beginning), and (d) knowledge (Practical Knowledge and Spot-A-Word). Detailed descriptions of the tests can be found elsewhere (Lindenberger & Baltes, 1994 , 1997 Lindenberger et al., 1993) . Two paper-and-pencil tests of reasoning ability were also administered: Raven Matrices Test, comprising 18 items (Raven, 1962; Wanner, 1998) different from the items administered during retest sessions, and the German version of Thurstone's Letter Sets (Form B; Thurstone, 1962) . linear and quadratic contrasts specified to assess retest session effects.
2 The mean T scores for the four groups across retest sessions are displayed in Figure 1 .
Reasoning
In validation of our group design, the ANOVA yielded main effects of age group, F (1, 64) We used individually estimated linear regression slopes (see Figure 2 ) to locate these interactions in post hoc comparisons. Our results showed steeper slopes in the young-olds (M ϭ 1.92, SD ϭ 0.93) than in the oldest-olds (M ϭ 1.46, SD ϭ 0.82), F(1, 66) ϭ 4.73, MSE ϭ 0.77, p Ͻ .05, and in the high-functioning (M ϭ 2.01, SD ϭ 0.85) than in the low-functioning group (M ϭ 1.36, SD ϭ 0.84), F(1, 66) ϭ 10.28, MSE ϭ 0.71, p Ͻ .01, which demonstrated plasticity advantages for the young-old and the highfunctioning groups, respectively.
Perceptual-Motor Speed
As in the reasoning domain, overall levels of performance were higher in the young-olds (M ϭ 61.09; SD ϭ 10.97) than in the oldest-olds (M ϭ 51.97, SD ϭ 7.44) , F(1, 64) Figure 2 ).
Visual Attention
The pattern of group differences was again replicated, with the young-olds (M ϭ 59.50, SD ϭ 9.25) outperforming the oldest-olds (M ϭ 52.34, SD ϭ 8.60), F(1, 64) ϭ 14.32, MSE ϭ 365.43, p Ͻ .001, and the high-functioning (M ϭ 60.47, SD ϭ 7.54) outperforming the low-functioning group (M ϭ 51.37, SD ϭ 9.29), F(1, 64) ϭ 21.26, MSE ϭ 365.43, p Ͻ .001. Retest improvement was significant for both linear, F(1, 64) ϭ 240.00, MSE ϭ 19.61, p Ͻ .001, and quadratic trends, F(1, 64) ϭ 24.00, MSE ϭ 6.87, p Ͻ .001; however, no interactions were reliable (Fs Ͻ 1.11, ps Ͼ .29).
We conducted additional analyses to determine whether level of cognitive functioning captured interindividual differences in plasticity over and above participants' education level. Education level was indeed positively correlated with percentile rank for level of cognitive functioning (r ϭ .28, p Ͻ .05); however, it was not reliably correlated with either retest gains (rs Ͻ .18) or improvement slopes (rs Ͻ .21) in any of the ability domains. In contrast, level of cognitive functioning was significantly correlated with both retest gains (r ϭ .34, p Ͻ .01) and learning slopes (r ϭ .41, c Categorized into three levels: 1 ϭ primary, 2 ϭ lower secondary, 3 ϭ higher secondary.
d Snellen decimal units (Lindenberger & Baltes, 1994) . e Thresholds in decibels (Lindenberger & Baltes, 1994) . p Ͻ .01) in the reasoning domain. Using education level as a covariate in the analyses described earlier led to the same patterns of results. In summary, our measure of the level of cognitive functioning proved to be a better proxy of the interindividual differences in plasticity relative to educational background.
Discussion
This study investigated the question of whether cognitive plasticity demonstrated in the young-old could be extended into the oldest-old and whether the plasticity and its age-related changes are modulated by the level of cognitive functioning (high vs. low). Specifically, we looked at basic forms of cognitive plasticity, operationally defined as performance improvement with retest practice on psychometric tests. We also note that the high-low level of functioning contrast was performed within a sample that captured about the upper two thirds of their respective Berlin age cohorts, as measured in the representative sample of the BASE (Baltes & Mayer, 1999) .
Effects of Age and Cognitive Functioning
The finding of this study provides unique evidence for differential learning within older individuals through a systematic comparison of the young-old versus the oldest-old. In this respect we replicated and extended earlier findings of persistent cognitive plasticity in young-olds (Baltes et al., 1989; Hofland et al., 1981; Kliegl et al., 1990; Rockstroh et al., 1995) . Most important and impressive, the evidence for continued plasticity is extended to the oldest-old with an age of 80 and above. Specifically, the oldest-old in this study show substantial improvements in performance, comprising approximately 1 standard deviation unit from the initial to the final retest session (reasoning, 0.92; perceptual-motor speed, 1.27; and visual attention, 1.09), despite a decline in learning magnitude relative to the young-old.
At first glance, our findings seem to be at odds with those of Singer et al. (2003) , who found almost no learning after initial instructional gains in very old participants. However, one important difference in their study was that the task (i.e., the method of loci) emphasized the acquisition of new skills and targeted episodic memory in a difficult context of serial learning. In contrast, our retest training paradigm targeted the basic skills presumed to be available in participants' behavioral repertoires. It could be that the learning on the method of loci was more constrained by the substantial age-related decline in episodic memory than was the performance improvement in the current tasks. Thus, this discrepancy suggests that the aging-related loss in plasticity proceeds gradually, with novel or more complex learning affected earlier by advancing age.
In considering the level of cognitive functioning, we use measures for which population norms are available. This novel approach in the plasticity literature strengthens the specification of our findings. First, we are able to conclude that the effects obtained concern about the upper two thirds of the age cohorts that are the population base for our samples. Second, the learning gains are rather general across levels of cognitive functioning. The only tests where there was evidence for functioning-level-based differential learning was the reasoning domain. Thus, overall, age, in our results, is not "kinder" to the more able with respect to the age-graded decline in performance and retest learning. This is consistent with earlier large-scale studies that used much longer retest intervals but did not observe differential gains as a function of baseline performance (Owens, 1959) or education (Christensen et al., 2001) . Going beyond these previous results, we demonstrated that the level of cognitive functioning, as we measured it, is more relevant in accounting for the interindividual differences in retest learning than is educational background.
The overall retest practice effects echo findings from the largescale longitudinal studies that the cognitive performance on the same tests improved over sessions (Ferrer, Salthouse, Steward, & Schwartz, 2004; Rabbitt, Diggle, Smith, Holland, & McInnes, 2001) . However, these studies failed to establish clear evidence for differential learning between age-groups. In this latter respect our study benefited from including very old participants in a dichotomized-group design and from using more frequent and shorter test-retest intervals.
Potential Mechanisms Underlying Retest Learning and Between-Domains Differences
Although this study was not designed to test specific models of retest learning in older individuals, we note that other authors have made very relevant proposals in this context. Hofland and colleagues (1981) made a case for the role of increased testing sophistication or familiarity and decreased anxiety in performance improvement. Others (e.g., Ferrer et al., 2004) have proposed item-specific effects presumably driven by memory for specific items or solution rules. In addition, Cherry and Stadler (1995) found that implicit learning, another potential contributor to retest learning, was relatively spared from age-related decline.
These described possible mechanisms underlying retest learning also shed light on the differences between the three ability domains. In the reasoning tasks, multiple rules and frequent variations in item surface structure clearly pose the greatest challenges for memory and item-specific learning; thus, we found that both age and level of functioning moderated retest gains in reasoning ability domain. A relative smaller item set (i.e., nine digit-symbol pairs) in the DSST relative to reasoning tests could possibly benefit and improve the efficiency of item-specific learning, thus eliminating the effect of cognitive functioning on the retest learning. However, it has been demonstrated that test performance and improvement in the DSST were indeed related to memory (Piccinin & Rabbitt, 1999) , which continues to decline from late adulthood to very old age (e.g., Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997) . This is in line with our findings that age moderates learning in this task. Finally, the D2 Test had a minimum target set (i.e., three targets). In addition, earlier studies showed that performance on the D2 Test is basically uncorrelated with immediate memory (Bates & Lemay, 2004) . With a primary focus on sustained attention, the D2 Test should thus benefit more from test sophistication, reduced anxiety, and implicit learning of target locations than from item-specific memory. Therefore, the absence of moderation effects for age or level of cognitive functioning in this task is plausible. Although our findings do not allow strong conclusions to be made about the relative contributions of these mechanisms, we argue that they are compatible with our claim that retest learning helps participants reactivate their available capacities without deliberately acquiring new skills.
Limitations and Future Perspectives
One caution to keep in mind is that our study included participants who actually came from the upper two thirds of the respective age cohorts living in Berlin. Including individuals from even lower levels of cognitive functioning might result in more pronounced negative effects of aging and level of cognitive functioning. Another limitation in our study is that we did not include tests of verbal abilities. One earlier study suggests that individuals with higher baseline ability, in higher social class groups, with more education, and who are younger are relatively protected from the age-related declines in verbal ability (Deary & Starr, 1999) .
Expertise and training research with the young-old have demonstrated the remarkable capacities of older professionals to maintain their skills or acquire new ones through deliberate practice efforts (e.g., Krampe & Ericsson, 1996) . However, even this age group faces decreasing benefits of practice and instruction (for an overview, see Krampe & Charness, 2006) . On the positive side, our study suggests that basic forms of learning remain available to the oldest-olds, though reduced relative to the young-old. Interventions should utilize these basic forms of plasticity as building blocks, starting off small and refraining from raising expectations to unrealistic heights.
